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The existing economics and political science literature has comprehensively analysed how the federal
budget is allocated to states. However, beyond the role of partisan alignment, the characteristics
of the governor in the receiving state is unexplored. There is also a body of work that shows that
the intergovernmental transfer system is subject to manipulation by politicians in countries beyond
the US (see Veiga and Pinho (2007) for Portugal, Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015) for the UK
and Gonschorek et al. (2018) for Indonesia.) However, there is only sparse evidence regarding the
role of the sub-national leader’s characteristics on the receipt of intergovernmental transfers (Veiga
and Pinho, 2007). This paper explores how a prior political career of a governor affects the federal
outlays to their state. Specifically, I focus on a prior career in Congress – having served in either
the lower or upper legislative house in the US. I develop the testable hypothesis that governors with
Congressional experience have more political nous, and, therefore, are more effective at lobbying
the president for federal funds.
To answer this question, I use a long panel dataset on federal-to-state transfers in the US
over the 1950-2008 period. I gather data on US governors Congressional service and personal
background from their online profiles on the National Governors Association (NGA) website. In
order to identify the impact of Congressional experience on transfers, I use a difference-in-difference
style approach and test for a number of threats to identification. Most importantly, I perform an
event-study to assess the common trends assumption and find no indication of problematic pre-
or post-treatment trends. I address selection concerns and show that the election of experienced
governors appears idiosyncratic and therefore unproblematic. The selection on unobservables would
also have to be implausibly high to completely explain away the effect. I conduct a placebo test
using random treatment assignment and find no evidence of systematic error. Moreover, I repeat
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the main analysis using a alternate dependent variable based on a state’s share of total federal
transfers and the relationship persists. I then conduct a battery of sensitivity checks to ensure
that the result is not driven by outliers in the explanatory variable. Such as, states that elect an
experienced governor more often or periods when governors with experience are more prevalent. I
also show that outliers in the distribution of transfers are not driving the relationship.
In summary, I find that governors who have previously served as members of Congress, on
average, increase the growth rate of transfers to their state by 0.8 percentage points. When exploring
which governors may be driving this result, I find that it is in fact the Republicans and provide an
explanation as to why this may be.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and provides a theo-
retical groundwork; Section 3 briefly describes the institutional setting; Section 4 presents the data
and empirical approach; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 conducts robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes and discusses the opportunities for future research.
2 Related literature and theoretical considerations
This paper relates to the literature on political leaders (Jones and Olken, 2005; Besley et al., 2011)
and the allocation of transfers (Larcinese et al., 2006; Veiga and Pinho, 2007). The latter shows
how sub-national transfer systems are affected by political manipulation, whilst the former both
show how the national leader has an effect on the economic performance of their country. This
paper connects these two distinct literatures.
Leaders in general matter and so do their socio-economic backgrounds. Hayo and Neumeier
(2016) show that the tenures of lower-class leaders are associated with high deficit-to-GDP ratio
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relative to upper-class leaders. The authors also show that this is the case of German state prime
ministers (Hayo and Neumeier, 2014). With respect to gender, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) find
no impact of female US mayors on the size of government, composition of expenditures or crime
rates. They do, however, show that females have superior political skill compared to equivalent
males. Likewise, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) find no evidence that female finance ministers
in German states have different deficits compared to males.1
Regarding on-the-job experience, Moessinger (2014) show that a more experienced finance min-
ister, measured by the number of years in the position, have smaller increases in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. Similarly, Fuchs and Richert (2017) show that more experienced development ministers ob-
tain larger aid budgets because the longer time in office strengthens their ability to negotiate. On
the sub-national level, Freier and Thomasius (2016) identify that German mayors who have prior
experience in office reduce public debt, lower expenditure and decrease local taxes.
More specific to this research, previous work has shown that the professional background of
political leaders affect the decisions they make when in office. For instance, Dreher et al. (2009)
shows that leaders who have a background as an entrepreneur are more likely to implement pro-
market liberalizing reforms. Whilst Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007) show that former central bank
staff prefer lower inflation rates than former politicians. Based on these findings, I hypothesize that
a relevant experience in politics, in this context Congress, should influence the work of governors.
There are at least two reasons why specifically Congressional experience may be positively related
1There is also a growing literature on leader origin, which shows that regions that provide national ministers
or representatives are favoured. Hodler and Raschky (2014) show that the political leader favours the sub-national
region they were born in. Whilst Dreher et al. (2016) demonstrate that African leaders’ birthplaces receive more
funding from China than elsewhere. Similarly, Franck and Rainer (2012) find that African leaders favour areas that
have the the same ethnic background as them. Jennes and Persyn (2015) show that the transfers to electoral districts
in Belgium are increasing with federal minister representation from that district. On the supranational level, Gehring
and Schneider (2018) show that the EU commissioner for agriculture increases their country’s share of the overall EU
budget.
4
to federal-state transfers. First, governors who have spent time in Congress will have been able to
hone and build their political capital working in the legislature on fiscal and legal agendas. This
technical experience in Congress should have provided an insight into how the political machine
works and will develop skills in communication and cooperation. These skills should give them an
edge on the competing governors, holding all else constant. Second, spending time in the legislature
may have provided an insight into the usefulness of extra funds for governors. Given that the federal
budget has to be debated and voted on in both the House of Representatives and Senate, not to
mention numerous committees and sub-committees, all Congress members should be acutely aware
of state funding.
While there is burgeoning body of work regarding how particular types of background affect
various economic outcomes, there exists very little work that explores a specific type of prior job.
Moreover, whilst some work has focused on sub-national leaders, none have so far explored how
sub-national leader’s prior political experience affects the transfers to their locality. The closest
study to this is Veiga and Pinho (2007). They briefly address whether the number of years in
office as mayor in Portugal affects the transfers they receive from the central government and find
a positive but insignificant effect. Assuming that governors wish to increase their state’s economic
performance, the federal transfers system represents one channel that the governors may wish to
exploit. I also build on the work by Dreher et al. (2009) who find no effect for the impact of a
previous career in politics in general on pro-market reforms. It is possible that their political career
variable captures an array of careers, whereas specific types of political jobs may be more useful
than others. Hence, more work is required to identify the jobs that develop political capital.
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3 Institutional setting
The federal budget in its current form is governed by the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. It
came after President Nixon sought to reduce the budget deficit by not spending funds that Congress
had allocated in 1972. This act aimed to strengthen Congress’ budget authority and reduce the
presidents impoundment ability. Despite this, the budgetary process is one legal scholars argue
that the president maintains significant control over due to the threat of veto, which can only
be overturned by a two-thirds majority in each legislative chamber (McCarty, 2000). Previous
work has acknowledged the role of the president in the distribution of federal resources. Levitt
and Snyder (1997) point out that “The inflow of federal funds to a district is affected by the
decisions of a large number of actors... The president plays major role, both in the budget process
and as chief executive”. At the state level, Larcinese et al. (2006) show that presidents engage
in tactical redistribution of federal by rewarding states that supported them in previous elections
and those that have a co-partisan governor. At the county and congressional district level, Berry
et al. (2010) show that areas represented by a president’s co-partisan legislator receive more federal
funds. Whilst Kriner and Reeves (2012) show that counties that receive more federal grants reward
the incumbent president or his party. Other work has focused on state representation in Congress.
Albouy (2013) show that states represented by members of Congress in the majority party receive
greater federal grants as they have greater proposal power or form coalitions with each other.
Although the literature on the US federal budget has highlighted the president’s influence, no
paper has yet investigated the role of the governors in a recipient state. The governors are the
head of the executive branch of the state government. They have a high degree of autonomy on
state administration, such as the budget, policies and legislation, and departmental appointments.
Regarding the link between the governors and the federal budget, consider the following state-
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ment from Mitt Romney in 2004, then governor of Massachusetts. “For Republican governors, it
means we have an ear in the White House, we have a number we can call, we have access that
we wouldn’t gave otherwise had, and that’s of course helpful”.2 Despite the partisan tone, this
example illustrates how governors can communicate with and influence the president to alter fed-
eral expenditure. Moreover, at the 2017 Governor’s Ball, President Trump remarked, in reference
to a meeting with the state governors, that “Everybody is different, every state is different, and
different requirements, but we think we have something that’s going to be really excellent... But
tomorrow morning, we’re going to meet and have some pretty big sessions on healthcare and other
things – whatever is on your mind.” An admission that depicts the president and governors inter-
acting with one-another and intent to explicitly discuss federal funding plans. The president has
also tweeted “Big dinner with Governors tonight at White House. Much to be discussed, including
healthcare.” Further evidence of communication between the president and governors regarding
the federal spending agenda.
4 Data and identification strategy
This section provides a description of the variables of interest and motivates the relevant control
variables. I use a balanced panel of the 48 contiguous states from the year 1950 up to the year
2008. I also discuss the empirical strategy used to identify the effect of interest.
2Speaking after the re-election of President G. W. Bush in 2004.
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4.1 Data
The dependent variable in the analysis is the growth rate of federal-to-state transfers per capita
in real terms. These are funds that are ultimately allocated by the president in the federal budget
and are used for specific functions, general financial assistance or as a share of tax proceeds.3 The
transfers are comprised of grants, aid, shared taxes, and contingent loans and advances. The federal
grants are the type of spending most susceptible to political control (Berry et al., 2010). These data
are obtained from the US Census of Governments. Given that different states have different needs
and economic situations, there is considerable variation amongst the amount of transfers awarded
to the states in a given year. The median growth rate is 3.7 percentage points per year. Transfers
are conventionally used to alleviate fiscal difficulty and to increase state welfare, however, given the
political involvement, it is important to explore how much political manipulation can explain the
differences across states.
The variable of interest in the analysis is a dummy variable denoted Congressional Experiencesgt.
This takes the value 1 if a state governor has previously served in either the House of Representative
or the Senate prior to taking office as state governor, and 0 otherwise. These data are hand collected
from the website of the NGA (see Figure A1 for an example of a governor’s profile). There are 61
governors who are ex-members of Congress which equates to 318 state-year observations.4 Figure 1
depicts the evolution of the number of governors with Congressional experience over time, with the
mean number being 5.4 governors per year. The spatial distribution of the number of observations
of governors with Congressional experience is presented in Figure 2. There are a number of states
that have not elected an experienced governor, for example Wisconsin and Utah, and two states
3Full for a complete breakdown of what is included and excluded in each category see https://www.census.gov/
govs/www/class_ch7_ir.html
4The names of these governors are listed in the Appendix Table A1.
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that have over 20 years with an experienced governor, Connecticut and Louisiana.
I include a set of governor characteristics that are potentially correlated with Congressional
experience and transfers. I control for the age of the governor and whether they are female to
account for demographic differences. In addition, I control dichotomously for military service. In
the US in particular, military service commands respect from politicians and therefore veterans
may be duly rewarded in the transfer system. Alternatively, they may receive fewer transfers as
they may be perceived to be better leaders. I include a measure of the number of years of on-the-job
experience as more experienced governors are more likely to receive more transfers. Gubernatorial
election year dummies are included to account for increased lobbying effort in a governor’s election
year. I also include a dummy to represent whether they are a lame duck and would therefore be
subject to fewer transfers, this is defined as whether or not the governor is in the last year of their
binding term limit. In terms of checks and balances, I use a dummy for whether the two state
legislative houses are controlled by different parties, which may mean the governor receives less
transfers because they are politically restrained. Crucially, I account for whether the governor is
politically aligned to the president, co-partisans governors may be likely to receive more federal
funds.
At the state-level I control for incumbent president’s two-party margin of victory from the last
presidential election. This account for presidents rewarding states that provided them with more
popular support. I include the previous year’s per capita growth rate of: personal income, a state’s
total own tax revenue and population from the previous year as covariates to control for state
economic performance and size.5 The descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Table A2.
5Changing whether these growth rates are at time t or t− 1 does not affect the main result.
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Figure 1: The number of governors who have Congressional experience
per year.
Figure 2: The number of governors who have previously served as a
member of Congress by state from 1950-2008.
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4.2 Identification strategy
The basic equation I estimate is as follows:




st + µs + τt + ǫgst (1)
where yst the growth rate of real per capita transfers to state s at time t; Congressional experiencegst
is the main explanatory variable that indicates whether governor g in state s at time t has previ-
ously served as a member of Congress; X ′gt is a vector of governor characteristics; Z
′
st is a vector
of state-level control variables; µs are state fixed effects; τt are year dummies; and ǫgst is the error
term. The country and year fixed effects are included to account for unobserved year-specific and
state-specific shocks that could bias the estimate of β1. The strategy is comparable to a difference-
in-difference style equation and therefore relies on the assumption of common trends in treated and
untreated states to establish a causal relationship. For the standard errors, I use two-way clustering
at the state and year level (Cameron et al., 2011; Cameron and Miller, 2015). This is because the
dependent variable is effectively a share of total transfers to all states, so correlation across states
at each year will exist.6
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Table 1 presents the main results. In column (1), I estimate the effect of Congressional political
experience on transfers without additional observable controls. In columns (2) and (3), I include
6When clustering at only the state level, the results remain the same, see Appendix Table A3.
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governor characteristics and then state controls as well, respectively. In column (4) I include a
lagged dependent variable. The coefficient of Congressional experience is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level of significance in all columns. This is interpreted as follows: when the governor
has previously served as a member of Congress, this leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the
growth rate of transfers per capita to their state, ceteris paribus. For a fictive mean state, the
growth rate of transfers is 4.1 percentage points, so this effect is quite sizeable.
The coefficients on the other personal characteristics are small and generally insignificant, this
indicates that these do not help a governor secure more federal funds. This is consistent with
findings reported in the literature (Dreher et al., 2009; Moessinger, 2014; Ferreira and Gyourko,
2014). The exception here is Alignment and Gubernatorial election, which are positive and
significant.7 The coefficient for Alignmentmeans that when governor and president are co-partisans
the governor receives more federal money, in line with the findings of Larcinese et al. (2006). The
Gubernatorial election coefficient indicates that in years when the governor is up for election, they
receive more funds as they exert more effort lobbying for more resources to aid their or their party’s
re-election chances.8
With a dichotomous variable of interest and year fixed effects, I can evaluate the common trend
assumption that is necessary for a causal interpretation of the effect. Despite using a comprehen-
sive set of controls, state and year fixed effects, there still may exist some bias. I can test this
assumption by examining whether pre-treatment or post-treatment trends exist for treated and
untreated states that would indicate non-random selection. Given that political experience should
only affect transfers when the governor has served in Congress only, significant lead-variables would
7I have also experimented with interaction terms with these two variables and Congressional experience, although
no significant effect is found.
8I have also controlled for governors behaviour in the year prior to elections, see Appendix Table A5. The pre-
gubernatorial election variable appears statistically insignificant, implying that governors only exert more effort to
capture federal outlays in their election years.
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Table 1: The effect of experience on transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Congressional experience 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Alignment 0.006* 0.005* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Years experience 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Military experience -0.003 -0.004* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lame duck -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Split govt. -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gubernatorial election 0.012** 0.011** 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ ln incomet−1 -0.154** -0.173***
(0.067) (0.058)
∆ ln revenuet−1 0.035 0.029
(0.030) (0.027)
∆ ln populationt−1 -0.064 -0.212
(0.332) (0.368)
Pres. victory margin 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Lagged dep. var. -0.265***
(0.027)
R-squared 0.353 0.356 0.355 0.402
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-
state transfers. The standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary corre-
lation at the state and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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cast doubts on the interpretation of the results thus far. Significant lag-variables are not necessarily
a violation of the assumption as transfers may be contract based and take time to reverse.
To test this assumption I follow Gehring and Schneider (2018). I create two lead variables,
taking the value 1 only in the year (t− 1) and two years (t− 2) before the treatment takes place,
and 0 otherwise. I code four lag variables taking the value 1 for the year after the treatment has
been ‘switched off’ in (t + 1) and up to four years later (t + 4), and 0 otherwise. The estimated
specification remains the same as that in Table 1 column (3), which includes all controls, state and
year fixed effects.9 Table 2 depicts the results including different leads and lags.
In column (1), both the lead variables are insignificant, whereas the coefficient of interest remains
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) replaces leads for lags. Here all the lagged
terms are insignificant and Congressional experience remains significant at the 1 percent level.
Finally, column (3) includes both leads and lags. The coefficient for Congressional experience
becomes 0.007, again significant at the 1 percent level. All leads and lags are insignificant, giving
no indication of any pre- or post-treatment trends, whilst Congressional experience remains sig-
nificant throughout. This is critical for a causal interpretation of the identified relationship. The
coefficients for the leads and lags for Congressional experience are illustrated graphically in Figure
3.
9The estimating equation is: yst = α1Congressional experiencesgt +∑4
γ=−2(α1t+γCongressional experiencesgt+γ) + β1 X
′
sgt + β2 Z
′
st + µs + τt + ǫsgt
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Table 2: Common trends
(1) (2) (3)
Congressional experience (t-2) -0.002 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Congressional experience (t-1) -0.005 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013)
Congressional experience 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Congressional experience (t+1) -0.007 -0.018
(0.014) (0.015)
Congressional experience (t+2) 0.005 0.011
(0.014) (0.013)
Congressional experience (t+3) 0.006 0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
Congressional experience (t+4) -0.007 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012)
R-squared 0.355 0.402 0.356
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: Variables omitted from all columns correspond with the specification in
Table 1 column (4), which includes state and year fixed effects. The dependent
variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-state trans-
fers. The standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation
at the state and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Figure 3: Leads and lags in Congressional experience.
Notes: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals are based on Table 2 column (3).
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6 Robustness checks
This section sets out to address how robust the relationship is. First, I address some possible
selection concerns. Secondly, I perform a placebo exercise and use an alternate dependent variable.
I then explore how sensitive the result is to excluding certain years and states. Finally, I split
Congressional experience into two variables based on the two-party system.
6.1 Selection concerns
One possible concern is the selection of leaders. If certain circumstances, such as an economic
or political crisis, affect both the probability of electing a governor with Congressional experience
and transfers, then there is an endogeneity issue. To allay this concern, I repeat the diagnostics
in Dreher et al. (2009). Results are presented in Table 3 Panel A. To be precise, I examine the
probability of electing a governor with Congressional experience. It appears that the selection
of experienced governors is idiosyncratic, the exception being the growth rate of personal income
which is controlled for in the analysis.
As a further check regarding selection, I assess the extent to which there may exist a bias from
the selection on unobservables. To do so, I follow the methods in Altonji et al. (2005). Under the
assumption that selection on observables is equal to the selection on unobservables, this method
produces the ratio of selection on unobservables to observables that would be required to explain
away the Congressional experience effect.
To implement this, I estimate regressions using two sets of covariates. In the first regression, I
include only the treatment indicator and year and state fixed effects. In the second I use the full
set of covariates along with the fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator






The results are presented in Table 3 Panel B. The ratio implies that selection on unobservables
needs to be 56 times as strong as the selection on observables to fully explain away the relationship
between experience and transfers, this is implausibly high.
Table 3: Selection of leaders
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A
∆ ln incomet−1 -5.757** -5.736** -5.727**
(2.277) (2.252) (2.256)
∆ ln revenuet−1 0.479 0.524 0.516
(0.470) (0.489) (0.484)
∆ ln populationt−1 -0.077 0.591 0.397
(6.862) (7.100) (7.036)




Dem. gov -0.191 -0.175
(0.302) (0.314)
Constant -2.033*** -1.885*** -1.917***
(0.243) (0.263) (0.317)





Notes: Panel A shows pooled logit estimates are conducted with stan-
dard errors clustered at the state level. The dependent variable is
Congressional experience. Panel B shows selection ratios from Al-
tonji et al. (2005). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
6.2 Placebo test and alternate dependent variable
To ensure that the statistical inference of the Congressional experience effect is not a result of a
systematic error, I implement a randomization test. This is particularly useful when the number
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of treated observations could be considered ‘small’. There are 319 treated observations, which
constitutes about 11 percent of the total sample. The goal is to randomly assign treatment to
control units, whilst removing the treated ones. No significant effect increases the confidence that
Congressional experience is correctly identified in actual treated units.
The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) assigns treatment status to about 11 percent
of the sample, column (2) 15 percent and column (3) 20 percent. As expected the coefficients are
not significantly different from 0. This furthers the confidence that the experience effect has been
correctly identified.
Table 4: Random assignment of treatment status
11% 15% 20%
(1) (2) (3)
Congressional experience [random] 0.005 -0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes
R-sqaured 0.350 0.350 0.350
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per
capita federal-state transfers. Variables omitted from all columns correspond
with the specification in Table 1 column (4), which includes country and year
fixed effects. Treatment assignment is assigned using the randtreat command in
Stata. In columns (1), (2) and (3) treatment is assigned to 11%, 15% and 20%
of the sample, respectively. The standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow
for arbitrary correlation at the state and year level using the xtivreg2 command
in Stata. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
To demonstrate the robustness of this result I construct an alternate dependent variable. I use
the percentage point change in a state’s federal transfers as share of total federal transfer outlays. I
repeat the analysis in Table 1 using the change in the state’s share as the dependent variable. The
results are presented in Appendix Table A4. As before, the coefficient for Congressional experience
is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all columns.
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6.3 Sensitivity checks
In order to show that the relationship between experience and transfers is not sensitive to outliers in
the data, I perform a number of additional checks.10 A concern may be that the result is driven by
states who are more likely to elect an experienced governor or periods of time when there are more
governors with experience in the US. Also, I explore how the results are affected by outliers in the
dependent variable. I repeat the preferred specification (Table 1 column (4)) and make exclusions
based on either states or years.
The results are shown in Table 5. In column (1) I exclude states that provide governors with
experience more than 15 times in the 59 years they are observed. This is keeping the bottom 90th
percentile. The coefficient falls to 0.006 but remains statistically significant. In column (2) and
(3) I exclude high and low periods of governors with experience. Specifically, I drop years when
there are more than 9 governors with political experience in column (2), this is the dropping the
top 10th percentile. In column (3) I drop the bottom 10th percentile, that is, dropping years when
there are no governors with experience. The coefficient remains stable at 0.008 and significant at
the 1 percent level. The proceeding two columns exclude states based on which region they are in,
here I split the US into two parts. Column (4) includes states in the West and Midwest regions,
whilst column (5) includes only states in the South and North East. A stronger significant effect
is found in the latter, although this possibly because there are much fewer treated observations
in the states located in West and Midwest. Column (6) and (7) winsorize the dependent vari-
able. This is a process that replaces extreme values in the tails of the distribution with values
further down the ranks. Column (6) replaces values below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile with
10In the Appendix Table A5 I include a number of other potentially relevant covariates. The result remains
qualitatively the same. I also repeat the common trends check with a lagged dependent variable, see Figure A2, the
result remains unaffected.
19
the 1st (99th) percentile value. Column (7) repeats this exercise with the 5th and 95th percentile.
The coefficient of experience falls to 0.007 but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5: Sensitivity checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Congressional experience 0.007** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.016* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Exclusion States Years Years Regions Regions Winsor [1,99] Winsor [5,95]
Treated Obs. 217 254 305 82 228 310 310
R-squared 0.364 0.343 0.392 0.359 0.394 0.363 0.358
Observations 2,451 2,448 2,400 1,311 1,425 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-state transfers. Variables omitted from all
columns correspond with the specification in Table 1 column (4), which includes state and year fixed effects. Column (1) removes states
that have governors with Congressional experience for more than 15 years. Column (2) removes years when there are more than 9 gover-
nors in the US with Congressional experience, the 90th percentile. Column (3) removes years when there are less than 1 governor in the
US with Congressional experience, the 10th percentile. Column (4) use only states in the West and Midwest region, while column (5) uses
only states in the South and North East region. The standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state
and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
As I am using data from the US, I can exploit the two-party system that dominates US politics.
This will allow one to see if one party is driving the results. I split the Congressional experience
variable into two new variables, to identify whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican
and has served as member of Congress. These are denoted Dem. Congressional experience and
Rep. Congressional experience. Experience is about evenly distributed between the two parties.
There are 159 state-year observations of Democratic governors who have served in Congress, and
155 observations of Republican governors.11 I repeat the analysis in Table 1 but instead include
the two new explanatory variables.
The results are presented in Table 6. Generally, it appears that the results are driven by the
Republican governors. The coefficient is shows that experienced Republican governors increase the
transfers to their state by about 0.9 percentage points, holding all else constant. The coefficient
for experienced Democratic governors is positive but only weakly significant. This is surprising
and contrary to what one may expect, given that state governments with more right-wing legisla-
11The remaining 4 observations are an independent governor.
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tors prefer smaller state governments (Pickering and Rockey, 2013). As Republican governors are
ideologically constrained in increasing their state’s expenditure, they will therefore seek out more
federal transfers as a less visible alternative using their superior political skill. On the other side
of the ideological split, the Democratic governors do not need to lobby and exert extra effort to
capture more federal funds as they are not constrained in increasing their state’s expenditures.
Table 6: Democrats versus Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dem. congressional experience 0.007 0.008* 0.008* 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Rep. congressional experience 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Governor controls? No Yes Yes Yes
State controls? No No Yes Yes
Lagged dep. var.? No No No Yes
Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.353 0.355 0.355 0.402
Observations 2,784 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-state
transfers Variables omitted from all columns correspond with the specification in Table 1 col-
umn (4), which includes state and year fixed effects. The standard errors are multiway-clustered
to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state and year level using the xtivreg2 command in
Stata. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
7 Conclusions
This paper has examined whether and to what extent does Congressional experience in US governors
affect the amount of intergovernmental revenue their state receives from the federal government.
The role of political experience has been examined in the previous literature with no clear con-
sensus reached, whilst the political influences on sub-national transfers received little attention.
Considering this gap in the literature, this an important topic of research. This paper has gone
beyond the previous literature which has focused only a general career in politics or the number
of years of on-the-job experience, whereas this paper explores specific political experience. That
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is, serving in the House of Representatives or the Senate. I hypothesize that governors who have
Congressional experience should have more political capital and therefore be better at lobbying the
president for federal transfers to their state.
To test that hypothesis, I use data on federal outlays to states over the period 1950-2008.
Findings show that a governor who has previously been a member of Congress increases to the
intergovernmental revenue to their state by 0.8 percentage points. The finding remains robust to
a number of different regression specifications. Moreover, there appears no reason not to label this
effect as a causal one. I find no significant effect for being a female governor or having more years of
experience on-the-job. There is a very weak negative relationship between a governor who served in
the military and the transfers they receive. In a gubernatorial election year, governors exert more
effort and thus receive more funds. I find that it is the experienced Republican governors who are
driving this relationship as they seek federal money as an alternate to increasing the size of their
state government.
The findings contribute to the expanding literature that shows that political leaders can have
a significant influence of economic outcomes. This paper presents a number of openings for future
research in this literature. One avenue may be to delve deeper into the governors backgrounds to
explore other political jobs that increase their political capital. It would also be fruitful to investi-
gate whether ex-members of Congress have different spending or taxation priorities. Perhaps they
are more likely to increase state expenditure if they know they can negotiate for more federal funds.
22
8 References
Albouy, D. (2013), ‘Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal
Funds’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 95(1), 127–141.
Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E. and Taber, C. R. (2005), ‘Selection on Observed and Unobserved Vari-
ables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools’, Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 151–
184.
Berry, C. R., Burden, B. C. and Howell, W. G. (2010), ‘The President and the Distribution of
Federal Spending’, American Political Science Review 104(4), 783–799.
Besley, T., Montalvo, J. G. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2011), ‘Do Educated Leaders Matter?’, The
Economic Journal 121(554), 205–227.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B. and Miller, D. L. (2011), ‘Robust Inference With Multiway Clus-
tering’, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 29(2), 238–249.
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2015), ‘Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference’, Journal
of Human Resources 50(2), 317–372.
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Hodler, R., Parks, B., Raschky, P. and Tierney, M. J. (2016), ‘Aid on
demand: African leaders and the geography of China’s foreign assistance’, Centro Studi Luca
d’Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 400.
Dreher, A., Lamla, M. J., Lein, S. M. and Somogyi, F. (2009), ‘The impact of political leaders’
profession and education on reforms’, Journal of Comparative Economics 37(1), 169–193.
Ferreira, F. and Gyourko, J. (2014), ‘Does gender matter for political leadership? The case of U.S.
mayors’, Journal of Public Economics 112, 24–39.
Fouirnaies, A. and Mutlu-Eren, H. (2015), ‘English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in intergovernmental
grant allocation in England’, Journal of Politics 77(3), 805–817.
Franck, R. and Rainer, I. (2012), ‘Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Educa-
tion, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa’, American Political Science Review 106(2), 294—-325.
Freier, R. and Thomasius, S. (2016), ‘Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for
public finances? Evidence for Germany’, International Tax and Public Finance 23(5), 875–910.
Fuchs, A. and Richert, K. (2017), ‘Development minister characteristics and aid giving’, European
Journal of Political Economy .
Gehring, K. and Schneider, S. A. (2018), ‘Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nation-
ality and Budget Allocation in the European Union’, American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy 10(1), 214–39.
Go¨hlmann, S. and Vaubel, R. (2007), ‘The educational and occupational background of central
bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis’, European Economic Review 51(4), 925–
941.
23
Gonschorek, G. J., Schulze, G. G. and Sjahrir, B. S. (2018), ‘To the ones in need or the ones you
need? The political economy of central discretionary grants - empirical evidence from Indonesia’,
European Journal of Political Economy .
Hayo, B. and Neumeier, F. (2014), ‘Political leaders’ socioeconomic background and fiscal perfor-
mance in Germany’, European Journal of Political Economy 34, 184–205.
Hayo, B. and Neumeier, F. (2016), ‘Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Public Budget
Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries’, Economics & Politics 28(1), 55–78.
Hodler, R. and Raschky, P. A. (2014), ‘Regional Favoritism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
129(2), 995–1033.
Jennes, G. and Persyn, D. (2015), ‘The effect of political representation on the geographic distribu-
tion of income: Evidence using Belgian data’, European Journal of Political Economy 37, 178–
194.
Jochimsen, B. and Thomasius, S. (2014), ‘The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance
minister to balance the budget’, European Journal of Political Economy 34, 390–408.
Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A. (2005), ‘Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since
World War II’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3), 835–864.
Kriner, D. L. and Reeves, A. (2012), ‘The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections’,
American Political Science Review 106(2), 348–366.
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L. and Testa, C. (2006), ‘Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States:
The Impact of the President’, Journal of Politics 68(2), 447–456.
Levitt, S. and Snyder, J. (1997), ‘The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes’,
Journal of Political Economy 105(1), 30–53.
McCarty, N. M. (2000), ‘Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics’, The
American Political Science Review 94(1), 117–129.
Moessinger, M.-D. (2014), ‘Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in
public debt?’, Public Choice 161(1), 183–207.
Pickering, A. C. and Rockey, J. (2013), ‘Ideology and the size of US state government’, Public
Choice 156(3), 443–465.
Veiga, L. G. and Pinho, M. M. (2007), ‘The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence
from a maturing democracy’, Public Choice 133(3), 457–477.
24
Appendix
Figure A1: Example profile of a governor on the NGA webpage.
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Table A1: List of governors with Congressional experience
Name State Party Name State Party Name State Party
Bob Riley Alabama R Ernie Fletcher Kentucky R Hugh Leo Carey New York D
David Hampton Pryor Arkansas D Edwin Washington Edwards Louisiana D John Joyce Gilligan Ohio D
Jim Guy Tucker Arkansas D David C. Treen Louisiana R Ted Strickland Ohio D
Ernest William McFarland Arizona D Bobby Jindal Louisiana R William W. Scranton Pennsylvania R
Jerry Brown California D Christian Archibald Herter Massachusetts R Tom Ridge Pennsylvania R
Abraham Alexander Ribicoff Connecticut D Foster John Furcolo Massachusetts D James Francis Byrnes South Carolina D
Thomas J. Meskill Connecticut R Robert L. Ehrlich Maryland R Carroll A. Campbell South Carolina R
Ella T. Grasso Connecticut D John Rettie McKernan Maine R Mark Sanford South Carolina R
Lowell P. Weicker Connecticut I John E. Baldacci Maine D Gordon Browning Tennessee D
John G. Rowland Connecticut R James Johnston Blanchard Michigan D Ray Blanton Tennessee D
James Caleb Boggs Delaware R William Bradley Umstead North Carolina D Don Sundquist Tennessee R
Pierre Samuel Du Pont Delaware R James G Martin North Carolina R Price Daniel Texas D
Lawton Chiles Florida D Arthur Albert Link North Dakota D Thomas Bahnson Stanley Virginia D
James E. Risch Idaho R Charles Thone Nebraska R James Lindsay Almond Virginia D
Clement Leroy ”Butch” Otter Idaho R Llewelyn Sherman Adams New Hampshire R George Allen Virginia R
William Grant Stratton Illinois R Judd Gregg New Hampshire R Michael Lowry Washington D
Rod R. Blagojevich Illinois D Jim Florio New Jersey D Arch A. Moore West Virginia R
Frank Carlson Kansas R Jon Corzine New Jersey D Bob Wise West Virginia D
William Henry Avery Kansas R Bill Richardson New Mexico D Frank A. Barrett Wyoming R
Albert Benjamin Chandler Kentucky D Charles Hinton Russell Nevada R
John Y. Brown Jr. Kentucky D Jim Gibbons Nevada R
Notes: D = Governor is a member of the Democratic Party, R = Governor is a member of the Republican Party and I = Governor is an independent.
26
Table A2: Summary statistics
No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ln transfers 2,784 0.041 0.104 -0.431 0.574
Congressional experience 2,832 0.112 – 0 1
Alignment 2,832 0.480 – 0 1
Age 2,832 52.32 8.040 33 78
Female 2,832 0.036 – 0 1
Years experience 2,832 2.994 2.757 0 15
Military experience 2,832 0.526 – 0 1
Lame duck 2,832 0.070 – 0 1
Split govt. 2,832 0.487 – 0 1
Gubernatorial election 2,832 0.296 – 0 1
∆ ln incomet−1 2,784 0.022 0.029 -0.152 0.331
∆ ln populationt−1 2,784 0.012 0.014 -0.059 0.120
∆ ln revenuet−1 2,784 0.032 0.099 -0.985 0.743
Pres. victory margin 2,832 9.236 18.34 -100 100
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Table A3: The effect of experience on transfers: alternate
clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Congressional experience 0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Alignment 0.006** 0.005** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Years experience 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Military experience -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Lame duck -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Split govt. -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Gubernatorial election 0.012* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ ln incomet−1 -0.154** -0.173***
(0.072) (0.058)
∆ ln revenuet−1 0.035 0.029
(0.033) (0.027)
∆ ln populationt−1 -0.064 -0.212
(0.318) (0.356)
Pres. victory margin 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Lagged dep. var. -0.265***
(0.023)
R-squared 0.353 0.356 0.355 0.402
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita
federal-state transfers. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and reported
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A4: The effect of experience on transfers: alternate
dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Congressional experience 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Alignment 0.013* 0.011 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Female 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Years experience 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Military experience -0.008 -0.011* -0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Lame duck -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021)
Split govt. -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Gubernatorial election 0.025* 0.024* 0.024*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ ln incomet−1 -0.401*** -0.446***
(0.113) (0.090)
∆ ln revenuet−1 0.130 0.093
(0.085) (0.063)
∆ ln populationt−1 0.324 0.045
(0.993) (1.095)
Pres. victory margin 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Lagged dep. var. -0.294***
(0.039)
R-squared 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.097
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,736 2,736
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-
state transfers as a proportion of total federal transfers. The standard errors are multiway-
clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state and year level using the xtivreg2
command in Stata. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Robustness: extra control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Congressional experience 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Alignment 0.006* 0.006* 0.005 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Years experience 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Military experience -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lame duck -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Split govt. -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gubernatorial election 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ ln incomet−1 -0.154** -0.154** -0.155** -0.154** -0.154** -0.154** -0.157**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065)
∆ ln revenuet−1 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.037
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
∆ ln populationt−1 -0.062 -0.059 -0.064 -0.063 -0.062 -0.060 -0.087
(0.331) (0.331) (0.332) (0.332) (0.331) (0.330) (0.329)
Pres. victory margin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000















Year FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.355 0.355 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.353
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,736 2,688
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal-state transfers. Column
(1) includes a dummy variable if the state is a swing state, taking the value 1 if the two-party vote share for the
president at the last election was within 5 percentage points. Column (2) pushes this out to 6 percentage points. Col-
umn (3) includes a dummy for whether the governor is a Democrat and located in the south. Column (4) includes a
dummy for whether the governor is the governor in the president’s birth state. Column (5) introduces a square term
for governors age and column (6) includes a dummy for whether the governor is a Democrat. Column (7) controls for
the pre-gubernatorial election year. The standard errors are multiway-clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at
the state and year level using the xtivreg2 command in Stata. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A2: Leads and lags in Congressional experience.
Notes: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals are based on specification in Table 2
column (3) but also include a lagged dependent variable.
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